Incidents related to hacking and network intrusion are on the increase. Most organizations safeguard themselves against cyber attacks by employing security methods such as encryption technologies, network monitoring tools, deploying firewalls and intrusion detection and response mechanisms. Even though prevention mechanisms are in place the vulnerabilities associated with any computer network or security tool can be exploited by hackers to generate attacks. A major drawback in apprehending cyber criminals is lack of efficient attribution mechanisms. This paper proposes a forensic profiling system which accommodates real-time evidence collection as a network feature to address the difficulties involved in collecting evidence against cyber attackers.
I. INTRODUCTION
All the government and federal organizations depend on the security of the network for efficient and uninterrupted functioning. The normal functioning of the organization can be disrupted in case of computer security failures. The hackers/attackers are capable of taking advantage of the vulnerabilities in the network.
This may result in reduced productivity. Cyber crimes can interfere with the services rendered by the organization leading to delays in transactions that can eventually lead to huge financial losses. Most organizations employ methods to secure their networks using encryption technologies, network monitoring tools, deploying firewalls and intrusion detection and response mechanisms. Inspite of all these security measures several compromises occur daily. Evidence collection, IP traceback and identification of the attacker are as important as intrusion detection when a network attack takes place. While there are several intrusion detection mechanisms available today, present technology lacks the tools and techniques for identification and IP traceback. Prosecuting hackers suffers from two major drawbacks: (i) non-availability of evidence in cases involving intelligent and professional hackers and (ii) jurisdiction constraints in the law enforcement due to state and country boundaries. In order to reduce computer related crimes the culprits should be prosecuted. But most of the times the hackers are able to evade the law because of insufficient evidence. The law enforcement agencies are thus stressing on the need for prompt and systematic forensic investigations and attack attribution mechanisms. Legal issues related with the evidence such as admissibility in court also needs to be addressed. Correlation of evidence in order to present a broader picture is also important. Computer forensics primarily relies on the information gathered from compromised systems after the incident has occurred. Therefore, handling incidents that involve smart hackers who can hide their tracks cleverly is difficult and extremely time consuming. Most of the network forensic analysis tools deal with voluminous data, and therefore investigation process is cumbersome and slow. In the proposed forensic profiling system, we intend to address the problem of evidence collection against the attacker by incorporating real-time evidence collection as a network feature.
Forensic investigation is dependent on the log files in order to determine the sequence of events that led to the attack. Every network element is capable of maintaining log files but these logs are volatile and overwritten after a certain interval of time. To expedite the process of forensic investigation and avoid retrieval of system logs after the victim machine crashes most networks are equipped with remote logging.
But searching through large log files and looking for suspicious activities is time consuming. At the same time all the log entries would not be relevant and therefore searching through all the log entries in order to find the ones that could be crucial for a case would be time consuming and cumbersome. Thus, centrally saving only those log entries that are responsible for generating the alerts in the system and may pertain to an attack is logical. The objective is to develop a framework for centrally monitoring and logging the malicious activities in the network that can eventually take the form of an attack. The logs so generated would be pertinent to the attack and would be used as evidence for forensic investigation. This paper proposes a Forensic Profiling System (FPS) that builds profiles of cyber attacks as they occur to help forensic investigation. A forensic profile is a set of structured or unstructured alerts that define known and unknown attacks. Forensic profiles are built by continuously monitoring the activities and network traffic at all the participating entities in the network. The forensic profiling system is based on client-server architecture wherein each node in the network acts as a forensic client and sends an alert to the forensic server if a suspicious event takes place at the client's machine. A suspicious network activity is an event that poses a threat to the security of a network. This work refers to the suspicious activity as an alert initiated by the forensic client to the forensic server. Each alert is described in a predefined when-subject-action-object format and contains the supporting data. The forensic server will put together these alerts and build the profile by correlating these alerts. In case the series of alerts received by the server do not sufficiently match a profile, the server will pro-actively probe the clients for more details.
Once all the necessary alerts and responses to probes are received, the server will create the profile. In case the server is not able to resolve the attack profile, it creates a profile with unstructured set of alerts.
An intrusion detection system is a dedicated network device working on detection and avoidance of network compromises. On the other hand, FPS is aimed at real time evidence collection in the event of a compromise. Intrusion detection system may fail because after generating an alarm it requires the intervention of administrator to stop the malicious activity. A delay in the administrator's action may result in a network compromise. Forensic profiling system includes IDS as a client and requires the IDS to report suspicious activity to the server. Intrusion detection system would not help if the attack is unique and the IDS does not have a signature for the attack. As most attacks have common alerts and an isolated alert is not indicative of an attack, FPS ia able to handle unknown attacks by aggregating the isolated alerts. The logical architecture that implements the proposed system can be extended to scalable network of dedicated forensic servers where each entity in the network acts as a client to one of the forensic servers.
The organization of the paper is as follows: section II reflects upon the related work, section III provides a detailed description of the forensic profiling system, section IV provides experimental results for DoS attack, section V presents a case study.In section VI summarizes the work with conclusions and future work.
II. RELATED WORK
Early intrusion detection system were modeled to detect anomalous activities on a single host. The best known host based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are TRIPWIRE that acts as a system integrity verifier and SWATCH which is a log file monitor. In order to monitor the activities of the entire network, network-based IDS came into existence. The network based IDS involved in intrusion detection related to large-scale distributed networks are Snort, e-Trust, NetSTAT and EMERALD (Event Monitoring Enabling
Responses to Anomalous Live Disturbances) [1] . For detection of coordinated attacks over large scale networks [2] suggest an architecture, CARDS (Coordinated Attack and Response Detection System).
The backbone of CARDS consists of independent but cooperative components. Deviation from normal behavior does not necessarily indicate the occurrence of an attack. Collaboration between the different intrusion detection and response systems has been the focus of recent research. MIRADOR [4] implements cooperation between multiple intrusion detections through a cooperation module. The cooperation module, CRIM [5] provides the interface for alert clustering, alert merging and alert correlation. The Common Intrusion Specification Language (CISL) proposed in [6] presents a language for communication between the different intrusion detection systems in a network. Common Intrusion Detection Framework only provides a means for communication between the different components of the network but does not facilitate on demand information gathering. [7] is an extension to CIDF and discusses the modeling of requests between the different components in a network.
Alert aggregation and alert correlation has been investigated in [4] , [5] , [8] , [9] , [10] . Clustering of similar alerts have been discussed in [4] , [9] but do not emphasize completely the underlying relationship between the alerts. Also, most of the alert correlation methods are restricted to known attack scenarios.
A formal framework for alert correlation and detection of multi-stage attacks has been developed in [10] .
Alert correlation is performed if the consequences of a previous alert serve as prerequisites for the current alert. But the alerts generated by the IDS do not confirm the possible consequence. For instance, if a bufferoverflow attack is detected by the IDS it does not imply that the possible consequence was true, that is, the attacker was successful in acquiring the root privileges. In order to determine if the attack was indeed successful, participation from other network components is important. In this paper we propose a mechanism for real-time forensic evidence where each network element is capable of detecting suspicious activity and provides evidence n the form of log entries indicative of the malicious activity.
III. PROPOSED FORENSIC MODEL
This section describes the forensic profiling system. The logical architecture which forms the backbone of the FPS is described first. It is followed by the definitions: profile, client-server, agent, alerts and probes. Different nodes in the network are capable of contributing to the security of the entire network if security features are configured and enabled. The forensic profiling system is based on client-server architecture where each node in the network, referred to as a forensic client, is capable of detecting an anomaly and warns a central server (forensic server) about the same in the form of an alert. All forensic clients participate in distributed intrusion detection and therefore maintain logs. The forensic client can be a router, a signature analyzer, an IDS, a firewall or a host in the network. The logical architecture for the forensic profiling system shown in Fig. 1 shows the interaction between the forensic server and the forensic clients using alerts and probes.
Forensic server and clients communicate through programs called agents. Agents running on the clients report an alert to the server in the form of alerts along with the associated evidence or logs which suggest such suspicious activity. The server correlates the alerts that it receives and builds a forensic profile.
Forensic server is the core component of the network. Forensic server maintains a database containing information about the known/investigated attacks in the form of descriptors called as the forensic profiles.
Whenever a suspicious activity is detected by the forensic client, it sends an alert to the forensic server along with the log entries for that particular time stamp. The forensic server in turn looks for a match for the alert received in the forensic profile database and queries the other forensic clients depending upon the matches found. The forensic server demands information regarding the other alerts that are a subset of the matched profile in the form of a probe. The response so received from the clients is analyzed by the forensic server and if it concludes that an attack is in progress, the forensic server generates a request for sending the log entries to the forensic clients and eventually an audit trail is embedded in the forensic profile.
A. Forensic Profile
Forensic profile is a structure that provides the relevant information about the attack in a succinct form.
Forensic profile in its nascent state is based on the known knowledge about an attack. It is a collection of alerts that provide an indication of the attack. An attack is composed of a series of inter-related events.
A subset of these events might be common to several attacks. Thus, a stand-alone event does not give complete information about the attack. In order to ascertain that a particular attack has occurred, a certain minimum number of events must be detected. A profile is a structure/descriptor that defines an attack in terms of its related events. The profile provides the relevant information about an attack in terms of its associated alerts.
The latent state of the network is defined as the state wherein the network is involved in non-suspicious activities that do not cause a threat to the security of the network. During latency the forensic server maintains a database of latent profiles of all known attacks. The latent profile is partial because it provides static and general information about an attack. The detection of an event (malicious activity) generates an alert. A latent profile may become active when an alert is generated. The latent profiles which contain a match for the alert generated are considered active. Fig. 2 depicts the relationship between Alert X received from a forensic client with the forensic profile database which is required to shortlist the active profiles. As Alert X is a subset of alerts associated with forensic profiles 1 and 3, the profile descriptors 1 and 3 are activated. In the latent state the activity of the entire network is monitored by the agents installed in each of the forensic clients. When an agent detects an event, it sends an alert to the forensic server along with log entries for that particular time. As an alert is a parameter of a profile, the forensic server searches for a match for the alert in the latent profiles and generate a stack of active profiles. In order to select one particular profile, the forensic server queries the other agents in the network for a similar kind of event by transmitting a probe to all the forensic clients. If a forensic client responds with information pertinent to an active profile the forensic server analyzes the active stack so as to reduce the number of active profiles. This is a recursive process until the entire attack is detected. The forensic profile is thus build from the detection of the first alert till the detection of the attack.
B. Client-Server
The forensic server carries out the coordination between the the forensic clients. The forensic server is capable of maintaining a latent profile for the attacks. The entire profile of an attack is build by the forensic server by gathering information from the forensic clients in the network after an alert is generated by one of the clients.
The mechanism discussed in section III.A would be applied to an unknown attack. An unknown attack does not have a latent profile. But since attacks have common events that trigger them, the alerts generated would be used to save the log entries in the forensic server that can be later used for forensic evaluation in order to trace the attacker and corroborate evidence. Intrusion detection systems normally work based on signature database and are unable to track illicit activity if a new or unknown attack is performed. The signature database needs to be updated in order to prevent such attacks. The forensic profiling system deals with this problem by creating an unstructured profile. If a profile for some suspicious activity is not matched with any of the known profiles, an unstructured profile is built with all the alerts generated in the same region and time span. This ensures that even if the attack was not stopped, the evidence related to the activity is collected and saved.
The entire profile would be built depending on the alerts generated by the different forensic clients in the network and the response obtained from the clients for the probes generated by the forensic server.
The complete profile would thus contain information about the attacker, type of attack, a chronology of all the events that followed along with the logs.
The co-ordination between the forensic clients is brought about by the forensic server. The forensic server is capable of receiving an alert from any of the client and it can generate a corresponding probe to one or all of the clients depending upon the alert generated and the appearance of the alert in the forensic profile database. 
C. Communication Signals between Network Components: Alerts and Probes
The forensic client continuously looks for anomalous activity and listens to the server for probes simultaneously. In order to accomplish this, two different agents working independently of each other, agent alert and agent probe, are installed in each of the forensic clients. Agent alert checks for any suspicious / unusual activity in the host by scanning logs, history files etc. and generate alerts. Agent probe, listens to the server for probes and sends the required information back to forensic server.
Agent alert is responsible for generating alerts to the server. The alert depends upon the detection of suspicious activity. The detection process involves active monitoring and active parsing. Active monitoring involves observing the performance parameters such as CPU utilization or event-log intensity, of the client and checking for discrepancies. Active parsing is continuous scanning of the entries in the log files and history files and check for suspicious entries (keywords) such as authentication failure, access denied, connection failure etc.
The events that can trigger alerts have been listed in Table I . The alerts generated by the forensic clients to the forensic server have a format that provides information about the time and the event that triggered it. The format is composed of When-Subject-Object-Action fields. Subject is the forensic client that triggers the alert, object is the network element on which the action occurs and the action specifies the event.
Probes are the queries generated by the forensic server to the forensic clients. The forensic server stores logs that indicate some suspicious activities. The forensic server is capable of generating two kinds of probes, Check Probe and GetLog Probe. Check Probe that checks for suspicious activity in relation to an earlier alert that was received by the server. If the forensic client responds with a NULL packet to the Check Probe then the server will not send GetLog Probe. Otherwise, the forensic server sends GetLog Probe to receive the log entries for that particular event.
D. Technique used for Active Monitoring of Events
Active monitoring is a continuous process that checks for variations in the intensity of events. Exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA), a statistical process control technique, is used to detect drift in the parameter being monitored [11] . The decision regarding the state of control of a process at any time instant depends on the EWMA statistic, which is an exponentially weighted average of all the prior data and depth of memory. EWMA control technique takes the statistic (CPU utilization, traffic intensity, log event intensity, memory utilization) that is to be monitored as argument in real-time and recursively checks if the current value lies within the control limits. The control limits are determined by the training data that is composed of usual or normal events. The testing data is interspersed with intrusive events.
The events in an information system are closely related to each other. Therefore, the EWMA technique that makes use of auto-correlated data has been applied. The EWMA statistic for ith observation z(i), is given as:
where, z(0) is mean of the training data, x(i) is ith observation, n is the number of observations to be monitored and 0 < λ ≤ 1 is the depth of memory. The depth of memory determines the rate at which the past observations enter into the calculation of EWMA statistic. Conventionally, λ = 1 implies the most recent observation influences EWMA. Thus, large values of λ give more weight to recent data and vice versa. Depth of memory depends on the parameter being monitored. That is, more depth into the history of events is required for event log intensity than for CPU utilization. For our calculations λ lies between 0.2 and 0.3 for log intensity measurement and 0.8 for CPU utilization. For auto-correlated data 1-step ahead prediction error e(i) is given as:
The control limits for the prediction error are determined by:
The parameter L is chosen to be 1.96 for 5% significance. The prediction error e(i) is independently distributed with mean equal to 0 and standard deviation σ e given by
Finally, the control limits for the statistic under consideration are given by:
Thus, if z(i) falls outside the control limits an anomaly is detected and an alert is generated by the forensic client to the forensic server.
E. Active Parsing Enabling Mechanisms and Tools
Most of the alerts generated by he forensic clients are based on parsing of the log files. Thus, the efficacy of FPS depends on the logging mechanisms adopted by the forensic clients. Default logging configuration does not log all the activities of the system. In order to maximize the logging capability changes have to be made to the configuration files and security tools are needed to be employed.
The logging is controlled by syslog daemon in linux machines. The log entries are saved in the files as specified by the configuration file, syslog.conf that is determined by the event. Logs are maintained to record su (switch user to root) command execution, logged-on users, log-on attempts and schedules jobs execution (cron jobs). Thus, parsing through the log file can determine an event that involves a number of failed attempts. This would eventually lead to an alert.
Parsing the history file continually is used to determine the execution of suspicious commands like chattr, chmod for critical files such as log files and the history file itself.
User activity logging mechanism can be configured into the linux machine by making use of the process accounting package. All the commands used at the console are logged into a binary file. This provides more information about command execution than the history file in terms of the user who executed the command, the CPU time, the connection times for each user etc.
Network monitoring tools for logging the activities of the entire network are deployed in the network.
The firewalls are configured to log connection failure attempts. The servers in the network are configured to log actions specific to the service provided by the server.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The experimental set-up constituted of two separate networks. A linux machine was configured as a 
A. Denial of Service Attack (SYN-FLOOD)
The most common form of DOS attack is the SYN-FLOOD attack. The SYN-FLOOD attack works by creating numerous half-open connections. This occurs when the attacking system sends SYN packets to a server with different spoofed IP addresses. This results in a half-open connection as the server sends a SYN-ACK packet but never receives an ACK from the client. A pending connection is written to a buffer of limited size. As the attacking machine creates an ever increasing number of pending connections, the buffer eventually overflows and the server is no longer able to handle any more connection requests. Thus the server is unable to serve the requests initiated by legitimate users. This leads to an increased traffic intensity. If a DOS protection mechanism is in place, the server will suppress further requests and that event is logged in the system logs. The number of requests suppressed depends on the rate limiter. Also, connection attempts by large number of IP addresses(spoofed) increases the frequency of log entries.
Thus, the DOS attack profile in its nascent state is as shown in Fig. 4 . network, a following DOS protection alert was sent by the web server to the forensic server generated by the parser for system logs.
DoS Profile Descriptor
• Alert generated by web server(192.168. The forensic server searches for a match in the forensic profile database and generates probes for the complementary alerts found in the DOS attack profile. The forensic server responds with a GetLog Probe and in turn receives the following logs from the web server (forensic client). These log entries are a part of the system logs.
System logs that indicate DoS protection in progress:
Dec The forensic server probes the entire network in order to consolidate the alerts that constitute the DoS attack profile. The complementary alerts for the DoS attack under consideration are increased traffic intensity and log intensity accompanied by a large number of connection attempts to the web server. In order to gather information about these alerts, the forensic server generates check probes to the web server simultaneously. The forensic client responds with the following alert and the corresponding log entries obtained from iplog file are sent to the forensic server.
• Alert generated by web server(192.168. Since an alert aggregation mechanism is employed, connection attempts from different IP addresses made at the same time is a single composite alert. Check probes for traffic intensity and log intensity also result in positive alerts from the web server. Thus, the forensic server is able to capture the forensic profile of the DoS attack that contains information pertaining to the attack in conjunction with the log entries that indicate the DoS attack. Since the protection mechanism was adopted by the web server, the DoS attack attempt was unsuccessful. The profiling technique employed by FPS is thus effective in tracking an attack when it is in progress and provides a comprehensive picture by logging only the anomalous activities in the network which in turn constitute forensic evidence.
V. EVIDENCE COLLECTION MECHANISM USING FPS: A CASE STUDY
This section has been divided into two segments. In the first segment we present a case study [16] that describes the forensic analysis of WU-FTP attack on a company's network. The second segment shows how FPS would generate the forensic evidence when WU-FTP attack is under progress. For an attacker to exploit the globbing vulnerability associated with 2.6.1 or earlier version of WU-FTP server, an attacker should have authenticated or anonymous access to the FTP server. Eventually, an attacker should be able to invoke buffer overflow and subsequently execute a process in order to install backdoor/Trojan/rootkit.
We present the progression of the attack in the following subsections specifying the different activities in the network that led to the disruption of the normal operation of the FTP server. The basic component of any network is its design. We start with the description about the network design of the victim company and then discuss the trail of events associated with the attack.
A. Victim Company's Network
The internal network of the company and the DMZ setup was designed better than most companies from security perspective. The DMZ consisted of all the standard set of network servers (web, email, DNS servers and also a dedicated FTP server, used to distribute hardware drivers for the company inventory).
Two firewalls were used one separating the DMZ from the internet and the other firewall separating the DMZ from the internal network (LAN). Two network IDS were a part of the DMZ setup. Individual firewalls were installed in each of the DMZ machines. No connections were allowed from the DMZ to either the internet or to the LAN. Also, no connection was allowed between the DMZ machines themselves.
An outside machine could connect only to a single port of each of the DMZ hosts. Each of the DMZ machines ran a host-based firewall.
B. Progression of the Attack
The forensic investigation team was notified by the company after a customer was unable to connect to the company's FTP server and subsequently it was discovered that the server's operating system had been deleted. Live forensic analysis related to the state of the machine could not be performed as the server had crashed unattended. The log files of the FTP server also could not be recovered as the syslog was not configured for remote logging. The entire forensic investigation was therefore based on hard drive forensic analysis of the FTP server and investigation of logs retrieved from the IDS and the firewalls.
Investigating 20GB hard drive for forensic evidence was time consuming. The log fragments related to the time of event were searched for. The following system log messages were recovered:
FTP System logs: As part of the network design discussed in section IV.A the connection between the DMZ machines was disallowed and therefore connection failure occurs.
The FTP transfer logs shown below imply the uploading of files on the FTP server.
FTP Transfer Logs:
Mon Apr The attacker is able to upload files on the FTP server as the FTP server was world-writable. This file is suspected rootkit and the script run by the attacker is analyzed. The attacker later deletes the operating system because of which the FTP server crashed.
In the following subsection we present the functioning of the FPS in collecting real-time forensic evidence while the attack is under progression.
C. Evidence Collection with FPS Installed in the Network
FPS works in alliance with all the network elements. The forensic clients are capable of detecting malicious activity and reporting the same to the forensic server. The clients send log entries corresponding to the alert to the forensic server. Eventually, the forensic server has a profile of the alerts that were generated along with the logs indicative of suspicious activity. In this section we discuss the working of the FPS had it been installed in the victim company. The forensic server contains the forensic profile database of the attacks. Since we present here the WU-FTP attack the forensic profile for WU-FTP is shown in Fig. 5 .
The unauthorized network connections are tracked by the FPS through the following alerts that would be generated by one of the firewalls in the event of a connection failure:
• Connection failure between DNS server and FTP server. • Connection failure between DNS server and Web server.
• Connection failure between Web server and FTP server.
• Connection failure initiated from DMZ to internal LAN.
• Connection failure initiated from DMZ to internet.
• Connection failure between any source machine and server port other than the one the server is meant for.
The action field of a connection failure alert generated by the forensic client (the firewall in this case) The forensic client, the IDS in this case sends the logs associated with alert to the forensic server. The reaction of the forensic server to an attack alert would consist of scanning through the forensic profile database and eventually probing the network. Alerts can be generated by two or more forensic clients simultaneously depending on the type of event detected by each of the clients. A suspicious activity detected by a forensic client can not alone determine the progression of an attack. But an IDS is capable of detecting an attack as a whole. The implementation of the forensic profiling system would differ in the steps followed in tracking the attack depending on the client that triggers the alert. The alerts to the server can be sent in any random fashion. We would investigate the flow of events if the attack is detected by the IDS and the IDS alerts the forensic server about the same in the form shown above.
The forensic server would scan for the WU-FTP profile and shortlist the alerts that would be later used to generate Check Probes. All these check probes would be generated simultaneously because though they are related from the point of view of the attack and occur in a chronological order they are independent of each other. The probes generated by the forensic server correspond to the alerts contained in the descriptor for the WUFTP attack. The Check Probe probes thus sent are: The forensic server would continuously send GetLog Probe to the FTP Server and if because of the attack under progression the FTP Server crashes down it would stop serving the getlog request initiated by the forensic server.
After gaining access to the FTP server, the attacker tried to connect to his machine, 192.1.2.3 which was not allowed. Also, the attacker attempted to connect to the mail server. This is implied from the FTP connection logs in section IV.B.The FTP connection logs specified in the section IV.B would be responsible for generating an alert to the forensic server as active parsing mechanism is a part of each of the forensic clients. Alert would be generated by the FTP server when a connection is attempted to a the mail server as it is an unauthorized network connection.
• Alert generated by FTP server to the forensic server for connection failure to mail server:
When Subject Object Action Apr 1 02:30:04 IP Addr FTP Server IP Addr Mail server FailConnection Similar alert would be generated by the firewall.
The attacker was able to gain root access upload file and later execute a script. This is inferred from the FTP transfer logs. The alert generated by the FTP server to the forensic server for the above log is:
• Alert generated by the FTP server to the forensic server indicating file upload: Since, the attacker was able to delete the operating system of the FTP server, the forensic server would not be able to receive response from the FTP server for any of its probes.
Subsequently, the forensic server would contain a forensic profile that would contain all the alerts and the forensic evidence in the form of suspicious log entries.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have proposed a forensic profiling system for real-time forensic evidence collection.
A dedicated forensic server is capable of maintaining an audit trail embedded in the forensic profile. As the aim of the FPS is to keep track of the anomalous activities in the network, time spent in filtering the system log files during a forensic investigation can be drastically reduced. This would help an organization to resume normal functioning after a compromise has taken place. Most of the hackers make sure that no logs are maintained while the attack is underway. FPS makes it easier to retrieve the logs of crashed hosts as the host is capable of sending log entries associated with an alert to the forensic server. Since, all the attacks have a general commonality in them, unknown attacks can be tracked by the forensic sever on the basis of the alerts generated by the forensic clients. Later, the forensic profile so built can be used for improving the FPS itself. We have investigated the performance of the FPS pertaining to the DOS attack and the WU-FTP attack. The complete functioning of the FPS involves detailed investigation of the attacks itself so that forensic profiles can be built upon the available data. Also, the overhead involved in the continuous process of active parsing and monitoring is required to be analyzed.
